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IMPACT OF THE PUBLIC GUARANTEE SCHEME ON LENDING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FIRMS AND BANKS 
The main aim of the ICO guarantee scheme, set in place 
under successive Royal Decrees (RDL 8/2020, RDL 
25/2020 and RDL 34/2020), is to enable firms1 to draw on 
the funds needed to deal with the fall-out of the crisis 
brought about by the sudden emergence of COVID-19. 
While such guarantees have had great success in 
providing liquidity to prop up and ensure firms’ survival 
during the initial phases of the crisis,2 their effects will be 
felt beyond 2020. Thus, this scheme may have longer-
term consequences – analysed in this box – for the lending 
relationships between non-financial corporations and the 
banking sector. In particular, the characteristics of the 
firms and banks involved in ICO transactions are analysed, 
and the impact of the ICO scheme on the level and 
structure of banking relationships.
Firm-bank characteristics associated with the granting 
of ICO loans
To analyse the likelihood of a firm receiving an ICO-backed 
loan, all firm-bank pairings on the Banco de España’s 
Central Credit Register (CCR) in respect of new financing 
transactions arranged between March and December 
2020 are identified. Firm-bank pairings in respect of new 
financing transactions requested by firms in that same 
period from banks with which they had no prior relationship 
have been added to this group. The database also 
includes all banking relationships at December 2019 
involving the firms that have obtained and/or requested 
funding identified in the two preceding steps. Lastly, the 
database is completed with economic and financial 
information on this set of firms at end-2019, drawing on 
the Banco de España’s Central Balance Sheet Data Office 
(CBSO) and using figures from banks’ end-2019 balance 
sheets and income statements taken from their regulatory 
reporting to the Banco de España. As a result, the group 
of firms that have actively sought funding is identified, and 
their associated structure of pre-existing banking 
relationships and the characteristics of the lending banks. 
Drawing on all this information, a linear probability model 
is estimated to ascertain which variables have most 
influence (and with what outcome) on the likelihood of a 
firm having received an ICO-backed loan between March 
and December 2020.3 The firm-specific explanatory 
variables include size, ex-ante credit risk score based on 
firms’ financial ratios, and economic sector indicators and 
postcode. The bank-specific explanatory variables 
include their size, capital ratio, profitability, and liquidity 
and NPL ratios. Lastly, the closeness of the firm-bank 
relationship is measured according to each bank’s share 
of a firm’s overall bank borrowing.4
As can be seen in Chart 1, the characteristics of firms 
most likely to have been granted ICO guarantees are size 
(being an SME increases their chances by 28.5%), level 
of ex-ante risk (the chances increase by 10.1% for each 
standard deviation by which the score decreases) or 
belonging to a sector affected by the pandemic (increase 
of 11.1%). Larger banks, those with more liquid assets, 
with a higher NPL ratio or lower profitability are also 
associated with a greater likelihood of an ICO guarantee 
being granted (increasing, respectively, by 30.7%, 5.6%, 
7.9% and 7.5% for each standard variation by which the 
explanatory variable worsens). Moreover, the closer the 
prior banking relationship (measured by the share of 
financing), the higher the probability (increase of 10.7% 
per standard deviation). These results are confirmed 
where the analysis is limited to firms that have 
relationships with several banks, including fixed firm-
specific effects. It is thus possible to fully control for firm 
characteristics, including demand for financing.5
1	 	The	analysis	uses	accounting	and	financial	ratios	of	firms	in	2019	and	is	thus	restricted	to	non-financial	corporations	(referred	to	generally	as	firms	in	
the	rest	of	the	box),	excluding	sole	proprietors.
2	 	See,	for	example,	Alves	et	al.	(2020),	Recent	developments	in	financing	and	bank	lending	to	the	non-financial	sector, Analytical Article, Economic 
Bulletin	4/2020,	Banco	de	España,	in	particular	Box	1,	and	R.	Blanco,	S.	Mayordomo,	Á.	Menéndez	and	M.	Mulino	(2020),	Spanish	non-financial	
corporations’	liquidity	needs	and	solvency	after	the	COVID-19	shock, Occasional Paper No 2020, Banco de España. 
3	 The	dependent	variable	of	the	analysis	takes	the	value	of	1	in	the	observations	where	an	ICO	loan	has	effectively	been	obtained	over	this	period.	By	











IMPACT OF THE PUBLIC GUARANTEE SCHEME ON LENDING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FIRMS AND BANKS (cont’d)
Impact of the ICO guarantee scheme on the level and 
structure of bank-firm financing relationships
The impact of the ICO guarantee scheme on the 
closeness of bank-firm financing relationships was also 
analysed, and the extent to which the continuation of 
such relationships has depended on the use of ICO-
backed loans. To this end, a difference-in-differences 
analysis was conducted, comparing (for each firm-bank 
pairing) changes in their share of financing between 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Each bar denotes the relative change in the average probability of a non-financial corporation having received at least one ICO-backed loan between 
March and December 2020 as the variable indicated in the x axis increases, from a standard deviation if it is continuous or shifting from zero to one if 
it is discrete (Firms SMEs, Firms Sector most affected). For this calculation a linear probability model was estimated using CCR data, cross-matched 
with CBB data on firms, and bank data extracted from their regulatory reporting to the Banco de España at end-2019. Firms' ex-ante risk is captured 
with a variable obtained from a scoring model, calculated based on a high number of its financial ratios. The severely affected sectors by the crisis are 
defined as those whose turnover decreased by more than 15% in 2020. Bank size is measured in terms of the logarithm of total assets.
b Each bar denotes the impact (in percentage points) that a bank's arranging with a firm at least one ICO-backed loan between December 2019 and 
June 2021 has on the change in the share of financing of the bank and the firm between those dates, estimated using a difference-indifferences 
model drawing on CCR, CBB and regulatory reporting data.
c Each bar denotes the impact (in percentage points) that a bank's arranging with a firm at least one ICO-backed loan between December 2019 and 
June 2021 has on the change in the share of financing of the bank and the firm between those dates, according to the residual maturity (in months) 
of the firm's pre-existing loans with the bank at December 2019. The bank's share of the firm's total financing and its share of financing without ICO 
guarantees are considered. The impact has been estimated using a difference-in-differences model drawing on CCR, CBB and regulatory reporting 
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Chart 2
IMPACT OF THE GRANTING OF AN ICO-BACKED LOAN ON THE SHARE OF THE FIRM'S 
FINANCING WITH THE LENDING BANK (b)
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Chart 3
IMPACT OF THE GRANTING OF AN ICO-BACKED LOAN ON THE CHANGE IN THE LENDING BANK'S SHARE OF FINANCING, ACCORDING TO THE BORROWING FIRM'S PRE-
EXISTING RESIDUAL BANK DEBT MATURITY (c)
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IMPACT OF THE PUBLIC GUARANTEE SCHEME ON LENDING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FIRMS AND BANKS (cont’d)
December 2019 and June 2021. This share is defined as 
the amount of loans obtained from each bank as a 
proportion of the bank funding the firm obtains. Two 
definitions of this share are analysed, for firms’ total bank 
funding and for financing excluding ICO-backed loans. In 
the terminology used in this type of study, firms with some 
type of ICO-backed loan during the period studied make 
up the treatment or study group, while all other observations 
make up the control group.6 As in the previous section, the 
characteristics of the firms and the lending banks are also 
taken into account.
Chart 2 shows that the grant of an ICO-backed loan by a 
bank to a firm is associated with a reduction in that bank’s 
share of bank loans without an ICO guarantee which that firm 
receives. Specifically, the change in the share of financing in 
loans without an ICO guarantee from December 2019 to 
June 2021 is 4.7 percentage points (pp) lower on average in 
this case. This effect is even more pronounced (8.1 pp lower) 
when the sample is restricted to firms with more than two 
bank relationships. When the impact of granting an ICO-
backed loan on the bank’s share of the firm’s total financing 
(including the financing guaranteed) is analysed, the opposite 
effect is observed: the change when an ICO-backed loan is 
granted is 14.6 pp higher for the total sample. Once again, 
the impact is greater (17.1 pp higher) when the sample is 
restricted to firms operating with more than one bank.
These results suggest that granting ICO-backed loans 
makes the overall firm-bank relationship closer, although it 
weakens when only the group of loans without public 
guarantees is considered. Consequently, it may be 
concluded that the granting of an ICO-backed loan is 
associated with different loan supply behaviour by the 
lending bank, which seeks to reinforce its relationship with 
the firm, but via loans with guarantees, reducing its 
exposure through other transactions.
As regards financing without an ICO guarantee, the 
above-mentioned reduction in share has been particularly 
sharp among firms with short residual bank debt 
maturities at end-2019. This suggests that banks and 
firms have replaced loans that have matured or are close 
to maturity with new ICO-guaranteed loans (see Chart 3). 
The fall in the share of financing without an ICO guarantee 
is also sharper for firms with a greater ex-ante risk, 
belonging to sectors hardest hit by the pandemic, and 
for banksthat had lower capital ratios at the start of the 
crisis. As regards the share of total financing, which 
includes ICO-backed loans, the presence of short 
residual maturities at December 2019 is associated with 
a more positive change (owing to the granting of new 
ICO-backed loans), albeit to a lesser extent for firms with 
a poorer ex-ante risk score.
6	 	The	intensity	of	the	treatment	was	also	analysed	using	a	continuous	variable	calculated	as	the	guaranteed	amount	as	a	proportion	of	the	firm’s	assets	
at	December	2019.	The	results	obtained	reinforce	those	described	here,	observing	stronger	effects	for	a	more	intense	treatment	(greater	weight	of	the	
guarantees	as	a	proportion	of	total	assets).	
